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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
According to Charles Reich in his widely read article 
Bureaucracy and the Forests, "the forests of our nation are 
a vast experiment in public ownership.It would be as 
accurate to state that the forests of our nation are a vast 
experiment in public administration. Article IV, Section 
III, of the United States Constitution, is the source of 
power for the Congressional delegation of broad, sweeping 
powers to specific governmental agencies for the administra­
tion of the national forests.̂  The subject of this paper 
will be limited to the United States Forest Service admini­
strative procedure as it affects the agency's interaction 
^C. A. Reich, "Bureaucracy and the Forests" (Center 
for the Study of Democratic Institutions at Santa Barbara, 
California, 1962). 
^The Forest Reserve Act of 1897 (30 Stat. 34, 16 U.S.C. 
551) imposed upon the Secretary of the Interior the duty to 
"preserve the national forests . . . from destruction" by 
regulating their "occupancy and use." In 1905 these duties 
and powers were transferred to the United States Forest Ser­
vice under the Department of Agriculture by the Act of Feb­
ruary 1, 1905 (33 Stat. 628, 16 U.S.C. 472). Today, three 
executive agencies control the nation's forests: the Forest 
Service in the Department of Agriculture, and the National 
Park Service and the Bureau of Land Management, both in the 
Department of Interior. This paper will address itself par­
ticularly to the Forest Service because it administers the 
largest share of the nation's forests and all of the public 
lands reserved as "national forests." 
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with the public. The author will superimpose the doctrine 
of public trust upon the Forest Service responsibility of 
"public" administration for the purpose of highlighting any 
present weaknesses, and to describe the potential of the 
doctrine as an administrative framework for public admini­
stration of environmental resources. 
Since the early 1960's, the Forest Service has come 
under some particularly sharp public criticism. Adverse 
environmental impacts on national forests have become mat-
3 ters of public record and concern. Government agencies, 
often held out as the "whipping boy" for the environmental 
ills of the country,^ are alleged to be self-perpetuating, 
bureaucratic monoliths often unresponsive to public inter-
C 
ests. The Forest Service is not immune from these allega-
^W. F. Lally, "Crisis on the Public Lands," Suffolk 
University Law Review (Vol. 6, Fall 1971). pp. 104, 107-110. 
See also: University of Montana "Bolle Report," (S. Doc. 
91-115, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. , 14, 1970). This report con­
cluded that citizen concern for Forest Service management 
was based upon U.S.F.S. "overriding concern for sawtimber 
production" and its "insensitivity to the related forest 
uses . . . and the public interest in environmental values." 
New York Times, November 14, 1971, p. 60, Col. 2. New York 
Times, November 15, 1971, p. 48, Col. 1. 
^L. L. Jaffe, "The Federal Regulatory Agencies in 
Perspective: Administrative Limitations in a Political 
Setting," Boston College Law Review (Vol. 11, May 1970), 
p. 565. 
^See generally: Ibid., pp. 565, 569, "bureaucracies 
tend to become somewhat ingrown, attached to their own con­
cepts of policy and resentful of outside pressures, particu­
larly those which they feel they can ignore." Also: C. A. 
Reich, "The Public and the Nation's Forests," California Law 
Review (Vol. 50, August 1962), p. 381. R. L. Ottinger, "Leg-
3 
tions. This onslaught of citizen confrontation is placing 
demands on the administrative functions of the agency as the 
Forest Service relates to concerned public interests. Citizens 
are battling in the courtroom,® seeking to limit agency dis­
cretion through mandatory legislation,? advocating "environ-
O 
mental management" of public forests, and demanding a new set 
islation and the Environment: Individual Rights and Govern­
ment Accountability," Cornell Law Review (Vol. 55, 1970), 
p. 666. See also: Testimony of J. L. Sax before the Commit­
tee on Conservation and Recreation, House of Representatives 
of Michigan, on H.B. 3055, January 21, 1970: "Official agen­
cies which are created to promote and protect the public inter­
est sometimes become too single-minded. In the past few years, 
a number of cases have brought home the degree to which impor­
tant regulatory agencies failed to take into account all the 
information and all the perspectives which a proper regard 
for the public interest required." 
C. 
Jaffe, o]3. cit., p. 568. "In a period in which many 
of the agencies have settled into unenterprising routines, 
the courts have set about to reawaken these agencies to their 
responsibilities for active and forward-looking decisions." 
See also: J. L. Sax, "The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural 
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention," Michigan 
Law Review (Vol. 68, January 1970), p. 473. "Private citizens 
no longer willing to accede to the efforts of administrative 
agencies to protect the public interests, have begun to take 
the initiative themselves." Also: Sierra Club v. Hickel 
(N.D. California, July 23, 1969); overruled by Sierra Club v. 
Morton (92 S.Ct. 1361, April 1972). Parker v. United States 
(309 F. Supp. 593, D. Colo., 1970). The West Virginia High­
lands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co. (Civil #70182~E, 
N.D. W. Va., June 1970). Gandt v. Hardin (Civil #1334, W.D. 
Michigan, 1969). 
"^Wilderness Act of 1964 (16 U.S.C. 1131-1136). National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (Public Law 91-190). The 
Scapegoat Wilderness Act of 1972 (Public Law 92-395). 
8 S. A. Cain, "Environmental Management and the Depart­
ment of Interior," Politics, Policy and Natural Resources 
(Edited by D. L. Thompson. New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 
354-362. See also: L. K. Caldwell, "Environmental Manage-
of relationships between the Forest Service and themselves.^ 
By the beginning of this decade, the cry for public 
participation in the Forest Service decisions affecting the 
allocation of resources and uses on public forest land was 
being taken seriously. To the credit of the Forest Service, 
it took the initiative to implement a number of programs 
designed to involve the public in inventory, planning, and 
decision-making stages of national forest management. 
This change in administrative procedure has been documented 
as a transition from "professional unilateral" to "democratic 
participatory" decision-making within Region I of the United 
States Forest Service. The question of whether any signi­
ficant change in the Forest Service administrative procedure 
has occurred is beyond the scope of this paper. It can be 
said with certainty, however, that legislation affecting the 
Forest Service relationship to the public has not been signi­
ficantly altered. 
ment," Environment: A Challenge for Modern Society (New York 
Natural History Press, 1970), pp. 161-251. Also: I. M. 
Hegman and R. H. Twiss, "Environmental Management of the Pub­
lic Lands," California Law Review (Vol. 58, 1970), p. 1364. 
^A. W. Bolle, "Public Participation and Environmental 
Quality," Natural Resources Journal (Vol. 11, July 1971), 
pp. 497-505. See also: Lally, oja. cit. , pp. 104-122. 
l°Region I of U.S.F.S. has employed "public involvement 
in the following national forest land-use planning units: 
Beartooth and Absaroka Primitive Areas, Rock Creek, and the 
Burnt Fork. 
W. Behan, "Wilderness Decisions in Region I, 
U.S.F.S.: A Case Study of Professional Bureau Policy Making, 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 
Berkeley, 1971). 
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The Forest Service is being challenged to adapt its 
procedures to a rapidly changing system of social values. 
American society is beginning to place a lot of importance 
on environmental quality, and at the same time has become 
critical of placing "blind faith" in industrial development. 
In this era of uncertainty, the Forest Service can be expected 
to look at its enabling legislation and the fundamental tenets 
of professional forestry for direction. It is the opinion of 
the author that neither the legislation nor the professional 
tenets provide a meaningful framework for the public admini­
stration of national forests today. Felix Frankfurter 
addressed the problems of the Thirties by stating: 
It is idle to feel either blind resentment 
against 'government by commission' or sterile longing 
for a golden past that never was. Profound new forces 
call for new social inventions, or fresh adaptations 
of old experience. The 'great society', with its perme­
ating influence of technology, large-scale industry, 
and progressive urbanization, presses its problems; the 
history of political and social liberty admonishes us of 
its lessons. Nothing less is our task than fashioning 
instruments and processes at once adequate for social 
needs and the protection of individual freedom.12 
The purpose of this paper is to develop the public trust 
doctrine as the "instrument" that could fit the environmen­
tal needs of public forest management in the Seventies. An 
important feature of this paper is an understanding of the 
potential of the doctrine as an administrative framework for 
12f. Frankfurter, "The Task of Administrative Law," 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review (Vol. 75, 1927), pp. 
614, 617-618. 
6 
the future uncertainties that are likely to face the 
Forest Service and other resource agencies in their inter­
action with the public on the allocation of forest uses 
and resources for the "public good." 
Direction 
The motivation behind the author's applying the 
public trust doctrine to public administration of nat­
ional forests should be made clear at the outset. First, 
it is the author1s opinion that the real potential of 
the doctrine is in its application at the administra­
tive level of the executive branch of government. Many 
articles have been written describing the doctrine as 
the basis for a citizen's right to enforce judicially 
the "public interest" in any particular environmental 
issue. This "judicial" application of the doctrine is 
very attractive, but does not necessarily develop the 
full potential of public trust law as it might apply 
to the day-to-day environmental management being car­
ried out by government administrators today. Second, the 
author feels that Forest Service legislation and case 
law suggests that elements of "public trust law" are 
already woven into the ownership and administration of 
7 
national forests and into the benefits derived from 
that forest land. Third, it is the author's opinion 
that there is no well defined administrative frame­
work from which the Forest Service is basing its "pub­
lic involvement" programs. Involving the public in the 
administration of the national forests is an attractive 
concept, but could turn out to be a pandora's box of 
"confusion and ineffectiveness" without fundamental 
guidelines from which to make professional land-manage­
ment decisions. 
The approach taken in this paper proceeds from 
the known to the unknown. A description of the basic 
concepts of American trust law and the public trust 
doctrine make up the second chapter. The author was 
not able to find any significant material that applied 
the doctrine of public trust directly to government ad­
ministration, therefore, chapter three is a combination 
of identifying elements of public trust law in Forest 
Service legislation and case law, and an elaboration 
on the application of the doctrine to Forest Service 
administration of public lands. The fourth chapter is 
an effort to superimpose the public trust doctrine 
on a case study in "unilateral" decision-making by the 
Forest Service. This type of analysis can. serve to 
8 
point out the weaknesses in the administrative procedure 
that the Forest Service has to fall back on today, and 
at the same time suggest what differences a public 
trust "framework" might make if similar facts were to 
surface today. The fifth chapter is a consideration 
of the implications that can logically be drawn from 
the application of the public trust doctrine to the For­
est Service administration of public forest lands. 
The hypothesis to be tested in this paper is 
that, despite the limited recognition of the public 
trust doctrine in law (i.e., legislation and case law), 
there is inherent in the laws of this country and the 
United States Forest Service a public trust in our 
national forests; that the resulting trustee relation­
ship provides a sound administrative framework for the 
Forest Service environmental management of the national 
forests; and, that this "framework" is comprised of 
definitive powers and duties of the agency, and rights 
of the public to protect and promote the national forests 
for both present and future generations. 
So to avoid any misconceptions, the author is not 
claiming that there is either a Congressional enactment 
or judicial recognition of a public trust in our national 
forests. If, however, the aforesaid hypothesis is valid, 
then a logical response might be to seek Congressional 
9 
enactment and/or judicial recognition of the public trust 
doctrine as the administrative framework for the Forest 
Service and perhaps other government agencies responsible 
for administering environmental resources. 
CHAPTER II 
THE DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC TRUST 
Trust Law 
American law recognizes a comprehensive body of trust 
law, but public trust theory has slipped into the background 
of judicial thought until recently. For purposes of this 
paper, the author defines the doctrine of public trust as 
the intention to impose legal obligations upon at least two 
designated parties for the continuance of an interest held 
in common by all members of the public. There are fundamen­
tal elements of trust law that should be understood before 
considering the public trust doctrine as a legal framework 
for administering environmental interests by governmental 
13 agencies. 
A "trust" is a fiduciary relationship^ between at 
l^The following material on trust law primarily orig­
inates from the most widely used reference books in the 
field of trust law: G. G. Bogert, Handbook of the Law of 
Trusts (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1963); A. W. 
Scott, Abridgment of the Law of Trusts (Boston: Little, 
Brown & Co., 1960); American Law Institute, Restatement of 
the Law of Trusts, 2d ed., Vol. I (St. Paul, Minn.: American 
Law Institute Publishers, May 1957). 
^Fiduciary relation: A person in a fiduciary relation 
to antoher is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other 
as to matters within the scope of the relation. American Law 
Institute, ibid., p. 7. 
10 
11 
least two parties with respect to property resulting from 
an intent to create the trust.15 The two parties are essen­
tially a trustee and a beneficiary. The trustee is the per­
son who holds legal title to the trust property for the 
benefit of another. The beneficiary is the person who has 
equitable title and for whose benefit the trust property is 
being held or used by the trustee. For example, this paper 
will be considering a government agency to be the trustee 
of certain public property for the benefit of the public as 
beneficiary. The trust property is the interest in the 
subject matter of the trust. That interest is separated 
into a legal interest (held by the trustee) and an equitable 
interest (held by the beneficiary). ̂  
There must be some manifestation of an intention to 
create a trust relationship before a trust is recognized in 
law. The trust intent is usually written in a trust instru­
ment, which is the document vesting property interests in 
the trustee and beneficiary. The trust terms are often 
spelled out in the trust instrument as rights, powers, and 
duties of the parties for the purpose of promoting and pro-
l^ibid., p. 6. 
l^The distinction between equitable and legal interests 
originates from the historical separation of legal and equit­
able courts. Today, the only distinction is that equitable 
rules and remedies that attach to equitable interests are more 
flexible than most rules of law. Equitable title is usually 
a non-possessory interest in property. Black's Law Diction­
ary, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1957). 
12 
tecting the trust. If the terms are not expressly excluded, 
then the usual rights and duties of the parties apply as 
defined in the substantive body of trust law. 
1 7 There are two major reasons for creating a trust. ' 
The first is simply to dispose of property, which is accom­
plished by the transfer of legal title to a trustee. The 
second reason for the creation of a trust is to establish a 
personal relationship involving rights and duties between 
the beneficiary and the trustee. Today most trust law has 
been built up around the former reason for creating a trust. 
On the other hand, the public trust doctrine emphasizes the 
relationships between the parties to the trust. 
Under general trust principles, the trustee is ex­
pressly empowered under the trust instrument, or has implied 
powers as equitably deemed necessary to carry out the pur­
poses of the trust. Upon acceptance of the trust by the 
trustee, the trustee is accountable for the following affirm­
ative duties unless expressly excluded in the trust instru­
ment: to administer the trust; to be loyal to the benefici­
ary; not to delegate those acts he can reasonably perform; 
to keep and render accounts; to furnish information to the 
beneficiary upon request; to exercise reasonable care and 
skill; to take and keep control of the trust property; to 
protect and to preserve the trust property; to enforce claims 
Ibid. , p. 2 . 
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by the trust; to keep the trust property separate; to make 
the trust property productive; to pay income to the benefi­
ciary; to deal impartially with beneficiaries; to act in 
accord with the exercise of the power delegated to persons 
under the trust, if that exercise of power is not in viola­
tion of the trust terms. 
The duties of the trustee are enforceable by the bene­
ficiary. The equitable remedies, ̂  usually more flexible 
than legal remedies, of the beneficiary are as follows: to 
compel the trustee to perform his duties; to enjoin the trus­
tee from committing a breach of trust; to compel the trustee 
to redress a breach of trust; to appoint a receiver to take 
possession of the trust property and administer the trust; to 
remove the trustee. 
Public Trust 
The doctrine of public trust, as defined from the 
Common law, applies the aforesaid principles of trust law 
to "public trust property." A critical point in understand­
ing the doctrine of public trust is that "public trust prop­
erty" is basically an interest in the subject matter of the 
J-^Ibid. , pp. 341-432. 
•^Equitable remedies are based upon principles of 
justice and right, rather than the sanction of positive law. 
Black's Law Dictionary, op. cit. 
2Pop cit., p. 433. 
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trust that is important ts the citizenry as a whole. The 
state or quality of the natural environment is important to 
the general public as they rely on certain resources and uses 
that accrue from that environment. Therefore, it would seem 
logical to consider the implications of juxtaposing the pub­
lic trust doctrine with the public administration of the 
national forests—which are a significant part of the natural 
environment. 
According to Joseph L. Sax, a professor of law at the 
University of Michigan and noted authority on the public 
trust doctrine,21 the public trust doctrine is based upon 
three related principles: 
First, that certain interests—like the air and the sea— 
have such importance to the citizenry as a whole that it 
would be unwise to make them the subject of private 
ownership. Second, that they partake so much of the 
bounty of nature, rather than of individual enterprise, 
that they should be made freely available to the entire 
citizenry without regard to economic status. And, 
finally, that it is a principal purpose of government to 
promote the interests of the general public rather than 
to redistribute public goods from broad public uses to 
restricted private benefit.22 
21professor Sax has authored two major works on the 
public trust doctrine and a model environmental protection 
act, parts of which have been incorporated into several state 
acts. See generally: J. L. Sax, Defending the Environment 
(New York: Knopf Publishing Co., 1971); J, L. Sax, "The Pub­
lic Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judi­
cial Intervention," Michigan Law Review (Vol. 68, January 1970), 
p. 473; J. L. Sax and R. L. Conner, "Michigan's Environmental 
Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report," Michigan Law Review 
(Vol. 70, May 1972) , p. 1004; J. L. Sax, "Environment in the 
Courtroom," Saturday Review (October 3, 1970), pp. 55-57. 
22Ibid., Defending the Environment, p. 165. 
15 
These principles have provided conceptual support for the 
public trust doctrine being an important legal theory for 
environmental law. The popular concept of the doctrine is 
that environmental interests in the air, water, soil, wild­
life, etc. are so inherently important to the public as a 
whole that they are held in trust by government for the 
benefit of all present and future generations of people. 
History 
The doctrine of public trust originated in Roman and 
English Common law.Historically, people have long sought 
to protect public property rights in rivers, the sea, and 
the seashore.This notion that public uses of particular 
natural resources were of special importance has carried over 
to American law.2̂  Our courts have rarely applied the doc­
trine of public trust, however. Those few cases that have 
applied the doctrine dealt with lands under navigable waters, 
? "3 For historical treatment, see e.g. W. Buckland, A 
Textbook of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian 182-85, 2d 
id (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1932); 
R. Hall, Essay on the Rights of the Crown and the Privileges 
of the Subject in the Sea Shores of the Realm, 2d ed. (Cam­
bridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1875); J. 
Angell, A Treatise on the Rights of Property in Tide Waters 
and in the Soil and Shores Thereof, 1st ed. (Cambridge, Eng­
land: Cambridge University Press, 1826). 
2̂ Sax, ojo. cit., Michigan Law Review, Vol. 68, p. 475. 
See also: Magna Carta and Northwest Ordinance. 
25sax, ibid. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367', 
(1842). Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 
(1892); U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, (1913). 
2(̂ In re. Crawford County Levee and Drainage District No. 
1, 182 Wise. 404, 196 NW 874, cert denied 264 U.S. 598 (1924). 
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parklands,27 shorelands,^8 ancj wiia animals in nature. 
Historically, the public rights recognized as basic 
tenets of water law have never existed in public land law. 
Individuals have had no separate interests in public land, 
but have been considered an amorphous body for whose welfare 
the public land was administered. The public body had no 
defined legal rights in public land.30 jn 1889 the U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized the concept of "public trust" in 
the public domain as a governmental obligation to "protect" 
and "invest" the trust: 
The public domain is held by the government as part of 
its trust. The Government is charged with the duty and 
clothed with the power to protect it from trespass and 
unlawful appropriation, and under certain circumstances, 
to invest the individual citizen with the sole posses­
sion of the title which had till then been common to 
all the people as the beneficiaries of the trust.31 
Congress had the power to regulate public lands, and according 
to this case was placed in the position of being responsible 
for managing the public lands held in trust by the Federal 
27Davenport v. Buffington, 97 F. 234 (8th Cir. 1899) . 
Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission, 350 Mass. 410, 215 
N.E. 2d 114 (1966). 
2®Shrively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894). 
2^La Costa v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545 
(1924). Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). 
30j. e. Montgomery, "The Public Trust Doctrine in 
Public Land Law: Its Application in the Judicial Review of 
Land Classification Decisions," Willamette Law Journal (Vol. 8, 
June 1972), pp. 135, 152. 
31U.S. v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 342 (1889). 
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Government. The management of the national forests was sub­
sequently delegated to the U.S.F.S. This case also stands 
for the proposition that Congress was in the position, "under 
certain circumstances," to invest legal title to parcels of 
the public domain in individual citizens. 
Generally, the doctrine of public trust is unsettled 
as to the difference between the general government obliga­
tion to act for the public benefit, i.e. the government 
police power, and the affirmative and more demanding duty 
which the government would have as trustee. A trustee is 
directly accountable to the beneficiaries of the trust, 
within the clearly established terms of the trust. This 
sharp delineation of responsibility and accountability on 
the part of the trustee, is central to the hypothesis of this 
paper. 
Scope 
Joseph Sax, in his extensive research of public trust 
cases, has found that courts have held three types of "trust" 
restrictions on governmental authority: 
First, the property subject to the trust must not 
only be used for a public purpose, but it must be held 
available for use by the general public; second, the 
property may not be sold, even for a fair cash equivalent? 
and third, the property must be maintained for particu­
lar types of uses. The last claim is expressed in two 
ways. Either it is urged that the resource must be held 
available for certain traditional uses, such as naviga­
tion, recreation, or fishery, or it is said that the 
18 
uses which are made of the property must be in some 
sense related to the natural uses peculiar to that 
resource.32 
The scope of the public trust doctrine is much broader 
than has been historically applied in American courts, accord­
ing to Sax.There seems to be sufficient latitude in the 
limited number of court decisions (involving the doctrine) 
for applying the procedural and substantive protections of 
the "public interest" to government administration of public 
land. The nature of public and private interests in the 
allocation of benefits derived from public lands can be said 
to be changing.34 Bernard Cohen addresses this change: 
The evolutionary shift from inalienability of public 
lands to protection of private property rights can prob­
ably be explained by the search for "progress" in an age 
of rapid technological advance. As Mr. Whitney's cotton 
gin increased production and Mr. Fulton's steamboat 
plied the navigable waters of a new land in the midst of 
an industrial revolution, it was assumed that production, 
navigation, and commerce were the national interest. 
Protection of the environment was relegated to a secondary 
role.35 
Cohen goes on to say that the trust doctrine has "passed 
through Whitney's cotton gin, emerging somewhat shredded."36 
32sax, op. cit., p. 477. See also: Hayes v. Bowman, 
91 S2d 795, 799 (Fla. 1957). 
33sax, ibid., p. 556. 
3^The issue of balancing interests in environmental 
issues usually centers upon the effects on economic progress 
in our free enterprise system. 
35b. S. Cohen, "The Constitution, The Public Trust Doc­
trine, and The Environment," Utah Law Review (Vol. 3, 1970), 
pp. 388, 389. 
3^ibid. 
19 
Today, the application of the public trust doctrine is becom­
ing important as protection of the environment has been ele­
vated to a primary role in public policy by both Congress 
and the courts throughout the country. 
The public trust doctrine is still considered "to 
have the breadth and substantive content which might make it 
useful as a tool of general application for citizens seeking 
to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource manage­
ment problems."37 The doctrine has received prominent atten­
tion in recent years from the point of view that it is a 
legal theory establishing a citizen's right, in his capacity 
as a member of the public, to sue for protection of the "pub­
lic interest" in the environment.38 
This judicial application of the doctrine has inherent 
weaknesses: First, the approach deemphasizes the administra­
tive and political realities that dominate the day-to-day 
management of natural resources; second, courts are not best 
equipped nor are they in the best position to make technical 
or value decisions in the public interest; third, judicial 
intervention, i.e., "suing the bastards," has a dramatic 
appeal to environmentalists, but the courtroom is not usually 
considered a panacea for the lojig-term environmental ills of 
37sax, ojd. cit. , p. 474. 
38see footnotes 21, 30 and 35. 
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the country. ̂9 The emphasis upon the enforcement of the pub­
lic trust seems at best remedial. 
The strength of the doctrine lies in the development 
of a democratic, administrative framework responsive to the 
public interests in a productive and liveable environment. 
The doctrine provides the essential elements for a clear 
determination of a "check and balance" interaction between 
government administration and the public for managing the 
environment. Administrative specialization and expertise 
found in governmental agencies, and public participation are 
necessary for managing the complex environmental resources 
of the twentieth century. The strength of the doctrine comes 
both from the rights of the public to make value determina­
tions as to the proceeds they wish to derive from the trust, 
together with the duties and powers of the public agencies 
to make physical determinations in promoting and protecting 
the trust. 
The tenets of the doctrine can be most advantageous 
to public resource agencies in defining and limiting their 
responsibilities to environmental management. Due to the 
broad and often ill-defined enabling legislation of many 
resource agencies, they are often placed in what seems to 
H. Hanks and J. L. Hanks, "The Right to a Habit­
able Environment," The Rights of Americans. (Ed. by N. Dorsen, 
1971), pp. 147, 170. See also: R. Beazley, "Conservation 
Decision-Making: A RationalizationNatural Resources 
Journal (Vol. 7, 1967). p. 345. 
21 
be an untenable position of determining both the biological 
constraints, and the public demands on a particular parcel 
of public land. The Forest Service, for example, is equipped 
to deal with the biological considerations of forest land 
management. Not even "philosopher kings," however, are in 
a position of effectively determining public wants and needs 
as they relate to the resources and uses that could accrue 
from public forest lands. 
What was once a relatively easy determination of pub­
lic values has become a difficult task for public administra­
tors today. Concerted market interests (i.e., free play of 
economic forces determining the resource and use demands on 
public land) have been in the position of influencing public 
agencies to exploit natural resources, because until recently 
the diffuse nature of ecological interests (i.e., balance of 
biological forces determining the resource and use demand 
on public land) provided little effective countervailing 
political pressure. The public trust doctrine could be effec­
tive if it served to place the professional forest manager 
in the position of managing for present productivity and 
long-term protection of national forests. This could place 
the task of determining public needs and wants back into the 
political arena, with the agency (i.e., trustee) acting only 
as a "catalyst" to the resolution of diverse public interests, 
and ultimately "registering" the value decisions of the 
^Reich, op- cit. , p. 13. 
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public. 
The following chapter considers whether the doctrine 
has the potential of differentiating between the trustee 
responsibility for the principle of the trust (i.e., manage­
ment of physical and biological characteristics of the 
trust), and the beneficiary responsibility for the trust pro­
ceeds (i.e. , determine the use and benefits of trust income). 
CHAPTER III 
THE PUBLIC TRUST IN OUR NATIONAL FORESTS 
Public Administration Under the Trust Doctrine 
There is no explicit legislative enactment of the pub­
lic trust in our national forests. Judicial interpretation 
of natural forest legislation and "courtmade" law in general 
point to an implicit recognition of the trustee relationship 
between the public and the United States Forest Service. 
There are a number of reasons for Forest Service personnel 
to consider the public trust doctrine as a framework for 
environmental management, the most significant being the 
clarification of their responsibility for managing public 
forest lands. 
It is understandable, in light of the recent prolifer­
ation of environmental lawsuits and the current interest in 
the public trust doctrine,^ that governmental agencies might 
react in a defensive manner toward the doctrine. Ralph A. 
MacMullen, past Director, Michigan Department of Natural Re­
sources, spoke to the contrary when he responded to being 
sued by citizens under Michigan's Environmental Protection 
Act of 1970:42 
41see footnotes 5 and 38 with accompanying text. 
42Michigan Comp. Laws Ann. 691.1201-691.1207 (Supp. 1972). 
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It is true that the Natural Resources Commission, upon 
my recommendation', approved construction. ... It is 
likewise true that suit has been brought under the Envir­
onmental Protection Act by persons who disagree with that 
decision. The Act—one of the landmark pieces of environ­
mental legislation in the nation—was passed for precisely 
that reason; to allow dissenting citizens an opportunity 
to register their dissents in court. Even though we have 
been made the defendants in this suit, we welcome it as 
an expression of public interest in the environment, and 
another step toward redefining the law so that we can 
better interpret the wishes of the people.43 
Although judicial enforcement of the trust is a significant 
factor in the doctrine, the strength of the trustee relation­
ship is in the clearly defined responsibilities of the parties 
to the trust, thereby serving to lessen conflict between the 
Forest Service and public in this case. Conflicts that do 
arise will tend to be more of a political nature between the 
beneficiaries, generally outside the arena of public admini­
stration, and so should not result in negative environmental 
impacts. The costs of political maneuvering would tend to 
be more social or economic in nature, especially where resource 
agencies are accountable for protecting the environment through 
time. 
Forest Service Legislation 
The Constitution empowers Congress to dispose of and 
make needful rules and regulations for the public lands.^ 
43Letter to the Editor, State Journal (Lansing, Michi­
gan, January 28, 1972), A-6, CoIT EZ 
44u.S. Constitution, Article 4, Section 3, paragraph 2: 
"The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all need­
ful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States." See also: U.S. v. 
City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940); U.S. v. 
Gratiat, 14 Pet. 526, 537. 
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In March of 18 91, Congress delegated that power by authorizing 
the President of the United States to "set apart and reserve 
. . . whether of commercial value or not, as public reserva­
tions"^ the forested lands within the public domain. Pub­
lic use of and the necessary administration of these forest 
reserves were made legal by the National Forests Organic Leg­
islation of 1897.46 It wasn't until 1905 that these delegated 
powers were placed in the newly formed United States Forest 
Service in the Department of Agriculture.47 Today, the Fed­
eral Government controls nearly 3/4 billion acres of public 
domain. Over 200 million acres of these federal lands, a 
diversified resource of timber, minerals, rivers, mountains, 
wilderness, and aesthetic beauty, are being managed by the 
Forest Service.48 
U.S. Forest Service Trustee Relationship 
Elements of the public trust in our national forests 
can be developed to serve as an administrative framework for 
defining the bounds of professional forest mangement, and 
the right of the public to participate in the allocation of 
45Act of March 3, 1891, 16 U.S.C. 471, 26 Stat. 1103. 
46sundry Civil Appropriations Bill of 1897, 16 U.S.C. 
471, 30 Stat. 35. 
47Act of February 1, 1905, 16 U.S.C. 472, 33 Stat. 628. 
48This 3/4 billion acres is about 1/3 of the total 
acreage of the United States. See: Public Land Law Review 
Commission, "One Third of the Nations Lands: A Report to the 
President and to Congress," (1970), pp. 21, 28. 
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of national forest resources. Reich suggested the need for 
such a framework when he said: "The standards Congress has 
used to delegate authority over the forests are so general, 
so sweeping, and so vague as to represent a turnover of virtu­
ally all responsibility.1"^ The trustee relationship, on the 
other hand, is usually construed by the courts as placing 
broad, discretionary authority (within the expressed terms 
of the trust) in the trustee to protect and make productive 
the trust property, and as giving the beneficiary the right 
to enforce the trust and deal with the proceeds of the trust 
(unless specified otherwise) in his best interest. 
The proceeds of the trust often depend upon how the 
trustee decides to "invest" the trust property. It would not 
seem extraordinary for the trustee to confer with the benefi­
ciary on the needs and wants of that beneficiary, so to, in 
fact, make the trust "productive" in the best interest of the 
beneficiary. The specific application of this trustee rela­
tionship within the Forest Service will follow a discussion 
of the identifiable elements of the public trust in our 
national forest. 
The legal interest that American citizens had in pub­
lic land was long ago transferred to the government in ex­
change for the government's promise to allocate uses and 
^Reich, o_£. cit. , p. 3. 
^A. Scott, Abridgement of the Law of Trusts (Bos­
ton: Little, Brown and Co., 1960). pp. 365-370, 398-401. 
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resources of that land for their benefit. In McColloch 
v. Maryland, a landmark case in the interpretation of the 
unenumerated powers of the United States under the Consti­
tution, the court said: 
The Government of the Union, then . . .is, emphatically, 
and truly, a government of the people. In form and in 
substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted 
by them and are to be exercised directly on them, and for 
their benefit.51 
This transfer of power to the Federal Government, and the 
establishment of a beneficiary relationship between the 
people and the government, present the fundamental elements 
of a public trust in those property interests the public 
believes are essential for quality living by the citizenry 
as a whole. 
As early as 1889, the U.S. Supreme Court in the case 
U.S. v. Beebe held that, "The public domain is held by the 
government as part of its trust." 2̂ Subsequently, the Pres­
ident of the United States was granted authority to set aside 
and protect forest reserves "for the use and necessities of 
the citizens of the United States."53 These public forest 
reservations were set aside for specified public uses, and 
were later referred to in our courts as public lands held in 
"trust" for the public as a whole. In 1910, in the case 
5117 U.S. C4 Wheat) 316, 404-405 (1819). 
52127 U.S. 338, 342 (1889). 
53sundrey Civil Appropriations Bill of 1897, ojp. cit. 
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Light v. United States, the Supreme Court of the U.S. held 
Forest Service regulations limiting private grazing rights 
on national forest lands to be constitutional because, "the 
government hold (sic) public lands in trust, for the people, 
to be disposed of so as to promote the settlement and ulti­
mate prosperity of the States in which they are situated."54 
The Supreme Court in that same case recognized a revocable 
public trust in forest reserves when it stated: 
'All the public lands of the nation are held in trust for 
the people of the whole country.' . . . And it is not 
for the courts to say how that trust shall be admini­
stered. That is for Congress to determine. The courts 
cannot compel it to set aside the lands for settlement; 
or to suffer them to be used for agricultural or grazing 
purposes; nor interfere when, in the exercise of its 
discretion, Congress establishes a forest reserve for 
what it decides to be national and public purposes. In 
the same way and in the exercise of the same trust it 
may disestablish a reserve and devote the property to 
some other national and public purpose. These are rights 
incident to proprietorship, to say nothing of the power of 
the United States as a sovereign over theproperty belong­
ing to it. 
This case marked a turning point for the public trust doctrine 
in that the decision was primarily based upon the proprietor­
ship doctrine (i.e., the government owns the public lands) 
and only made limited mention of the public trust.56 That 
"limited mention" is very important, however, because it 
established the fact that only Congress can "establish" or 
54220 U.S. 523, 530 (1911). 
55ibid., p. 536. 
5^Supra, p. 10. 
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"disestablish" the public trust in our national forests. 
Further mention will be made on the effect of the proprietor­
ship doctrine upon the public trust in our national forests. 
The important point to keep in mind is that the government, 
as trustee, would hold legal title to the forest reserves 
and thus clearly have "rights incident to proprietorship. "5*7 
The Forest Service is now under the broad, sweeping 
mandate of the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Forestry Act of 
1960.58 in accord with this Act, Congress did not decide to 
"disestablish" the public forest reserves, but did, in fact, 
broaden the terms of the public trust in our national for­
ests. This Act directs that "it is the policy of the Congress 
that the national forests are established and shall be admin­
istered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and 
fish, and wildlife purposes," and "that the establishment and 
maintenance of areas of wilderness are consistent with the 
purposes and provisions of section 528-531 of this title."59 
This mandate to the Forest Service also repeats the directive 
of earlier national forest legislation by stating that manage­
ment of the national forests will be employed that "will best 
meet the needs of the American people . . . and provide the 
maximum benefit for the general public. 
57Montgomery, oja. cit. , pp. 157-60. 
5816 U.S.C. 528-531. 
59lbid., 528, 529. 
60Ibid., 531(a). 
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The Multiple Use Act states nothing about national 
forest "productivity" being synonymous with the generation 
of revenue from forest practices such as logging. The legis­
lation states that consideration must be given "to the rela­
tive values of the various resources, and not necessarily the 
combination of uses that will give the greatest dollar return 
6 1 
or the greatest unit output." Market interests in the envir­
onment "appear to be consistently favored by the administrative 
agencies over 'non-economic' uses such as wildlife protection 
and recreation." It would be naive to harbor the belief 
that the Forest Service is not conscious of this political 
pressure by market interests, and perhaps resource agencies 
are eager themselves for a respite from such pressures. The 
Forest Service "public involvement" programs would indicate 
this at least. However, it would be equally as naive to suppose 
that this public agency is not feeling the heat of a groundswell 
of citizens' interest in the environment today. 
Political pressure groups, such as Sierra Club, Wilder­
ness Society, and others, are beginning to balance the market 
demands that have been ever present on the national forests. 
But, neither the public nor the Forest Service have yet 
61Ibid. , 531 (a* . 
® Montgomery, op. cit., pp. 138-39: "This favoritism 
stems from political pressure . . . as a result of statutory 
revue (sic) sharing arrangements which funnel a fixed percen­
tage of the receipts produced from the recovery of public land 
natural resources back to the local government unit in which 
the federal land is located." 
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realized that "instrument" or "process" for arriving at a 
meaningful complement for achieving a balance of all these pub­
lic interests, that will still allow the forest manager suffi­
cient latitude for environmental management of our national for­
ests. The U.S.F.S. "public involvement" programs seem to be di­
rected at determining public interests, but could prove to be 
distracting from the task of environmental forest management by 
not limiting the political involvement of public administrators. 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, is in 
accord with the public trust doctrine as applied here on the 
federal level: 
. . . it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal 
Government to use all practicable means, consistent with 
other essential considerations of national policy, to 
improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, 
and resources to the end that the nation may— 
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation 
as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations; 
. . .63 
Federal courts have recently said that governmental agencies 
can no longer approach their responsibilities as "umpires 
blandly calling balls and strikes," rather, they have an 
affirmative duty to thoroughly and openly study an issue 
before acting in the public interest.jt is important to 
recognize, as Charles Reich eloquently puts it, "that in a 
democracy the 'public interest' has no objective meaning 
63public Law 91-190, sect. 101(b)(1). See generally: 
Hanks, op. cit., "Environmental Bill of Rights." 
64Hanks, op. cit. , The Rights of Americans, p. 169. 
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except insofar as the people have defined it; the question 
cannot be what is 'best' for the people, but what the people, 
adequately informed, decide they want."65 The National 
Environmental Policy Act provides for this "public participa­
tion" in the decision making processes of administrative 
government, in addition to framing a national policy for a 
decent environment: "The Congress recognizes that each per­
son should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person 
has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and 
enhancement of the environment." The U.S.F.S., within the 
Department of Agriculture, does come under this national man­
date of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 
This brief look at Forest Service enabling legislation 
and the judicial interpretation of some of those laws strongly 
suggests an implicit public trust in our national forests. 
The national forest reserves were set aside for particular 
public purposes, the public was designated beneficiary of the 
reserve, and the Forest Service was delegated the authority 
of a trustee for the management of those forest reserves. 
Based upon court interpretations of public trust cases and 
the implicit public trust in our national forests, it could 
be said that: the national forests should be managed for 
public purposes and yet be available for use by the general 
^Reich, op. cit. , p. 10. 
^Public Law 91-190, sect. 101(c). 
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public; the specified interests of the forest land should not 
be sold, unless by Congressional declaration; and the forests 
should be maintained within natural capabilities and produc­
tivity over the long run.^7 The present Forest Service 
directives of "multiple use" and "sustained yield" tie in 
well with this public trust administrative framework. Further 
elaboration, however, should serve to point out some substan­
tive differences and, most important for this paper, some 
significant procedural differences between present public 
administration and prospective public administration based 
upon the public trust doctrine. 
Important to the public trust doctrine is the comple­
ment between the duties and powers of the trustee for man­
aging the trust, and the rights of the beneficiary to enforce 
C o 
the terms of the trust. The result can be a complementary 
interaction between these parties for maintaining a "produc­
tive" public trust. The trustee is accountable for making 
the trust "productive," but the trustee is seldom, unless 
expressly stated in the trust terms, placed in the position 
of making value determinations for the beneficiary.̂  This 
would suggest that the Forest Service, as trustee, would not 
6?See footnote 15 and accompanying text. 
6^Supraf pp. 10-13. 
^Scott, oj5. cit. , pp. 283-287: Spendthrift trusts, 
discretionary trusts, and trusts for support can be excep­
tions where the trustee is placed in a position of determin­
ing what is "best" for the beneficiary. 
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be placed in the political position of reconciling the great 
diversity of public interests and values in public forest 
lands. The agency might best serve as a "catalyst" for this 
political process of public value determinations. Involving 
the public in the initial stages of forest land-use planning 
could provide reciprocal understanding by the public and the 
agency of the constraints and values to be considered in a 
particular land-use decision. Accountability on the part of 
the Forest Service would be limited to their assuring present 
"productivity" and guaranteeing long-term alternative uses 
of the nation's forests. The public would have the right to 
define what mix of resources and uses was in their best 
interests. 
Although beyond the immediate scope of this paper, 
brief mention should be made on the logistics of political 
reconciliation of diverse and perhaps conflicting public 
interests in public forest land. The essential point here 
is that the public administrator, as trustee, would be cata­
lytic to political determination of the "public good." 
Public involvement at all levels of Forest Service planning 
provides a "quasi-political" format for reconciliation of 
public interests. If the public interests are polarized, 
then greater public visibility must be achieved through 
Congress or, if necessary, through the courts. A more diffi­
cult problem here is just how to weigh or even tally public 
inputs: What about the problem of national versus local, 
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informed versus uninformed, large special interest groups 
versus individual expressions of public interest, etc.? 
There is an important point to make in uncovering this "quag­
mire." The public trust framework for public administration 
is basically a conceptual delineation of responsibilities 
between the administrator and the public, so that the resource 
administrator does not get caught in this "quagmire" of polit­
ical reconciliation of diverse and/or conflicting public int­
erests to the detriment of the natural environment he is 
responsible for managing. Further development of this prob­
lem could easily provide the substance of another major paper 
and, therefore, must be left for another time. 
Under the trust doctrine, the public could directly 
participate in Forest Service resource and use decisions 
(i.e., proceeds of the trust), and the agency would have 
discretionary powers for actual forest land management 
(i.e., protecting and promoting the principle of the trust). 
The public demands for particular forest resources and uses, 
as determined between participating public interest groups, 
would define a "productive" trust, if those demands were 
within the natural capabilities of the trust property. The 
Forest Service, as trustee, would be accountable for the 
final land management decisions. This accountability can 
be translated into "how well" the Forest Service is able to 
"fill" the public demands for certain proceeds from the trust, 
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within the physical and biological constraints of that public 
trust property. 
The Forest Service, again as trustee, could present 
alternative management plans that would, in their profes­
sional judgment, "fit" the capabilities of the forest land. 
This would place the agency in the position of advocating the 
best management practices for the land for present "produc­
tivity" (to fill present public needs and wants) and future 
alternative uses. Close interaction with the various public 
interests during this planning process would place the agency 
in a good position to predict the particular mix of proceeds 
the public would like to see coming from the public trust 
land. The ultimate decision of which alternative (or combin­
ation of those presented by the agency) management plan would 
best fit all the represented public interests, would be a 
decision for the public within the political arena. The 
Forest Service would have to register this decision by the 
beneficiaries of the trust and abide by it if it was within 
the natural capabilities of the forest land being considered. 
Professor Reich notes, "Lawyers know from long experi­
ence that disinterested, well-considered decisions are most 
frequently reached by clearcut separation between those who 
advocate and those who decide."^0 This "separation" is 
possible under the trust doctrine, as the trustee advocates 
^^Reich, oja. cit. , p. 6. 
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what land management practices are best for the trust prop­
erty, and the beneficiaries decide what proceeds are in 
their best interests. The trustee, however, is accountable 
for continuing the trust and therefore must make the final 
decision as to what investment will be made for the trust. 
Trust law preference for continuance of the trust and 
prohibition of the invasion of the body of the trust would 
place the burden of documenting the reasons why the trustee 
proceeded with a certain management plan upon that trustee. 
This burden of proofand substantive trust law would put 
the Forest Service in the position of basing its decisions 
on sound technical data, and preparing public records on how 
and why particular management decisions were made. 
Forest Service proprietorship?2 does not lessen the 
grounds for a public trust in the national forest. Legal 
title to national forests rests with the U.S. Government and 
equitable title rests with the public. This point refers 
back to the citizens giving certain interests over to the 
U.S. Government in return for the public benefits of govern­
ment administration, and is in accord with the two reasons 
earlier stated for designating a trust relationship.Not 
L. Jaffe, "Administrative Law: Burden of Proof 
and Scope of Review," Harvard Law Review (Vol. 79, 1966). 
pp. 914, 920. 
?2Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 526 (1840). See 
also: Montgomery, op. cit., pp. 158-60. 
?^Supra, p. 12. 
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only has there been a land transaction from the people to 
the government, but a definitive trustee relationship could 
be interpreted as having been established between the Forest 
Service and the public. 
CHAPTER IV 
A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE 
The Public Trust in the Lincoln Back Country 
August 20, 1972, marked the end of a seemingly end­
less struggle between environmentalists^ and the Forest 
Service over the fate of 240,000 acres of de facto wilder­
ness land in northwestern Montana.^5 on that day, the "Scape­
goat Wilderness" Bill was signed into law by the President of 
the United States. This struggle was popularly referred to 
as the "Lincoln-Back Country Controversy,"*^ and arbitrarily 
commenced on March 27, 1963, when the Forest Service made 
public their "Long Range Plan" for development of 177,000 
74"Environmentalists" will represent both conserva­
tion and environmental interests, for the purpose of this 
paper, as looking out for the ecological interests of land-
use rather than market interests. 
75scapegoat Wilderness Act, Public Law 92-395. 
^For complete development and analysis of this con­
troversy, see: R. W. Behan, "The Lincoln Back Country Con­
troversy: A Case Study in Natural Resource Policy Formation 
and Administration," (Unpublished paper, University of Mon­
tana, 1969) ; and D. R. Kendall, "The Lincoln Back Country 
Controversy: A Case Study of Public Land Administration," 
(Unpublished Masters Thesis, University of Montana, 1970). 
39 
40 
acres of national forest land in northwestern Montana.^7 
The ensuing controversy was a model example of low-profile 
decisions made "for the people's benefit" by governmental 
agencies. This chapter will serve to review the facts of 
the Lincoln-Back Country and to apply to them the previously 
discussed tenets of the public trust doctrine. This appli­
cation of a trustee relationship between the public and the 
Forest Service should serve to demonstrate the practical use 
of the doctrine by all three branches of government, with 
particular emphasis placed on the advantages to the admini­
strative process in managing our forest resources. 
The Setting 
The Long Range Plan, as it was presented, was to have 
sweeping effects on a land area well over twice the size of 
the Lincoln Back Country, but it was the inclusion of this 
area of land which proved to be the "call to arms" for many 
environmentalists. The Back Country was a well known land 
unit encompassing 75,000 acres of national forest within the 
planned development area. The Back Country had gained an 
identity as a wilderness-type recreation area over years of 
use by outdoor enthusiasts throughout Montana as well as the 
rest of the country. Despite this accepted fact, neither 
77;Long Range Plan, Northern Half Lincoln Ranger Dis­
trict, Helena National Forest (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Forest Service, Northern Region, March 1963). 
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the general public nor environmental interest groups were 
made aware, prior to the issuance of the Long Range Plan, of 
the U.S. Forest Service consideration to develop these 
177,000 acres of public land. The Long Range Plan called 
for timber harvest, recreation development, dispersement of 
hunting and fishing, and construction of related roads into 
this de facto wilderness. 
In 1960, the Lincoln Back Country Protective Associa­
tion was formed as a citizens effort to: 
. . . encourage protection of wilderness, water, wildlife, 
forest and field; to seek wise use of land and water in 
broad public interest, nurture and improve wildlife stocks; 
and restore and rehabilitate wildlife environment. 
To sponsor and support legislation designed to end 
methods and activities destructive to natural resources 
and to institute methods seeking to replenish and renew a 
sound resources economy.78 
Perhaps the formation of this organization, three years before 
the appearance of the Plan, was an intuitive response in 
anticipation of a threat to the Lincoln Back Country.^9 By 
the summer of 1962, the Association began enlisting broad 
public support for protecting the "wilderness" encompassed 
in this 75,000 acres of national forest. It was also about 
^^Constitutional By-Laws of The Lincoln Back Country 
Protective Association, Article 2 (Unpublished, Lincoln, Mon­
tana) . 
7®The Multiple Use Act of 1960 had just recently passed. 
In addition the Forest Service was in the process of transi­
tion from an era known as "custodial management" to what is 
now recognized as "intensive management"; see also, M. Clawson 
and B. Held, The Federal Lands; Their Use and Management 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1957), pp. 29-36. 
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this time that the Helena National Forest Advisory Council 
voted six to two in favor of supporting the Forest Service 
in their long range multiple-use planning for the Lincoln 
Ranger District. It was later pointed out that the Council 
was thinking in terms of hundreds of years, rather than the 
five or ten years being considered by the U.S.F.S. as long 
range planning in this case. The Council was composed of the 
following private citizens during the Back Country controversy: 
The Chairman, the owner of a Helena hardware store 
A farmer, representing the water users and irrigation 
interests 
The owner of a large sheep ranch 
A professional educator 
A cattle rancher 
A commercial guide and packer 
A logging contractor from Lincoln 
A representative from a smelting and refining company 
in Helena 
A Helena newspaperman 
The owner of one of the cafes and motels in Lincoln 
A representative of the State Board of Equalization 
A representative of the State AFL-CIO^O 
Three members were absent when the vote was taken, and the 
chairman did not vote. 
The public announcement of the Forest Service Long 
Range Plan met with quick and intense public opposition. 
Resistance coalesced around the feeling that the Forest Ser­
vice had acted in a deceptive manner, and developed from a 
strong public sentiment for the Lincoln Back Country per se. 
Environmental groups were conspicuously absent from an advance 
mailing of the Long Range Plan by the Forest Service. On 
^Behan, op. cit. , p. 17. 
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April 19, 1963, a public "meeting" was held upon a public 
request for a "hearing." An equal time regulation was en­
forced at the meeting and a public request for a vote of dis­
approval was denied by the U.S.F.S. Concerned citizens were 
beginning to realize the unwillingness and seeming inability 
of the U.S.F.S. to respond to expressed public interest against 
development of the Lincoln Back Country and contiguous national 
forest land. 
The efforts by citizens and environmental groups to 
"delay" implementation of the Long Range Plan, at least until 
a thorough resource study could be made, were thwarted by 
what seemed to be determined efforts of the Forest Service 
to develop this public forest land area.^ These citizens 
called upon the Montana Congressional delegation in despera­
tion. Wilderness classification for the Lincoln Back Country 
was proposed during the 1965 Congress.̂  jt j_s ironic to 
note that neither of the parties to this controversy was 
originally asking for wilderness classification. Six years 
of Congressional proposals for wilderness classification and 
four proposals by the Forest Service for development of this 
national forest land intervened before the Forest Service 
came on record as recommending wilderness classification of 
81see footnote 4 and accompanying text. 
82senate Bill 107, and House of Representatives Bill 
7366. 
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this area in August, 1971.®^ The Scapegoat Wilderness is a 
reality today, and we are left wondering if the public inter­
est was served by this confrontation between the Forest Ser­
vice and the environmental interests.^ Perhaps wilderness 
classification of this area was more the result of the defen­
sive reactions on the part of both parties to this contro­
versy, than the expressed public interest in a wilderness use 
of the area. 
The Trustee Relationship 
The important feature of the trust relationship is 
the complementary interaction between the citizenry and the 
Forest Service to promote the "usufruct"®^ of our national 
forests. Usufruct, in this case, would be the public benefit 
derived from government management of the present use of the 
national forests without altering the long-term use options 
proposal: Scapegoat Wilderness, Helena, Lolo, 
and Lewis and Clark National Forests, Montana (U.S. Depart­
ment of Agriculture, Forest Service, August 1971). 
84Perhaps wilderness classification in this case was 
simply the result of a public emotionally reacting to the 
defensive posture that the Forest Service assumed at being 
rebuffed in their effort to define the "public good" in for­
est land management. 
8^A. w. Scott, Abridgment of the Law of Trusts (Boston: 
Little, Brown & Co., 1960), p. 19. "Many of the functions 
which are performed in the Anglo American system by the use of 
the trust were performed in the Roman Law through the usus or 
usufructus . . . and in the modern civil' Taw by the modern 
equivalents of these devices." The presumption of this paper 
is that no equivalent of "usufruct" has yet been adapted to 
public forest management. 
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of the particular forest site involved. 
As stated earlier, there is a trust law preference for 
continuance of the trust and the prohibition of invasion of 
the principle of the trust.8̂  This preference could be trans­
lated by the courts into a specific duty by the Forest Service 
to maintain the natural uses of a particular forest site if 
o 7 
this meets with approval by public interest groups. The 
Lincoln Back Country was de facto wilderness and had limited 
alternative use potential,**8 and, therefore, it could be said 
under the public trust doctrine that the Forest Service acted 
in derogation of its affirmative duty to protect the trust, 
when it attempted to develop the Back Country, especially 
without consulting the most vocal of public interests concerned 
with the area. 
The terms of the trust, as derived in particular from 
the Multiple Use Act of 1960, provide optional land uses for 
Q Q 
management, J including wilderness. That legislation, how­
ever, does not clearly define the duties and powers of the 
8®See footnote 71. See also: State v. Cleveland and 
P.R.R., 94 Ohio 61, 80; 113 N.E. 677, 682 (1916). 
o n 
See footnote 32. The example of an appropriate use 
of San Francisco Bay is often used as an example to show what 
a "natural" or "traditional" use would be. A public trust 
imposed upon the Bay area would allow construction of a dock 
or marina but would not allow filling the Bay with garbage or 
for a housing project. 
p o 
°°Kendall, op. cit., p. 11. 
8916 U.S.C. 528-531. 
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the Forest Service as trustee, and rights of the public as 
beneficiary. A commensurate accountability and responsibil­
ity should attach to each of these respective duties and 
rights. 
Under the public trust doctrine, the courts might 
construe a public right to impose the citizens' wishes upon 
the administrative decision-making process insofar as they 
wish to demand certain uses and resources from the public 
trust. The Forest Service would have the complementary 
duty of providing the public with all relevant information 
for determining the potential of the forest land. This duty 
includes the development of a complete record of all techni­
cal considerations and alternative forms of management. In 
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Com­
mission , Judge Paul R. Hays held: 
The record on which it bases its determination must be 
complete. The petitioners and the public at large have 
a right to demand this completeness. It is our view, and 
we find, that the Commission has failed to compile a rec­
ord which is sufficient to support its decision. The Com­
mission has ignored certain relevant factors and failed to 
make a thorough study of possible alternatives to the 
Storm King project. 
As in the above case, the Forest Service failed to conduct a 
thorough resource study of the Lincoln Ba,ck Country, and 
failed to offer alternative plans until 1971, that were based 
9^354 F2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert, denied 384 U.S. 
941 (1966). 
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upon the public interests in the area.®-'- In addition, the 
broad range of public interests were excluded from the deci­
sion-making process at several levels; in initial studies, 
on the Helena National Forest Advisory Council, and in the 
advance mailing of the Plan.®2 
The proceeds that result from investment of trust prop­
erty must be "reasonable" and within the terms of the 
trust.National forest legislation sets out directives, 
that could be considered trust terms, for forest mangement 
that "will best meet the needs of the American people . . . 
and provide the maximum benefit for the general public." 
It seems only reasonable that the trustee in this case would 
confer with the beneficiaries to realize what their "needs" 
were, so to provide "maximum benefit" for them. The Forest 
Service in the Lincoln Back Country Controversy did not ade­
quately determine the "needs" of the public, or, more approp­
riately, did not allow the political process to work out the 
"public interest" in that case. The public turned to Congress 
to counter the Forest Service "determination" to develop 
this public land. Concerned citizens seemed to have no other 
effective checks upon the agency. The trust relationship 
could have provided initial agency interaction with the 
public, allowed the political process to run its natural 
9-^-See also: Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. U.S., 
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). 
® 2Supra , p. 40. 
93scott, crp. cit., pp. 359, 370. 
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course, and if necessary, could have served to establish the 
citizens' rights to judicially enforce the public trust in 
the Lincoln Back Country. 
Enforcing the Public Trust 
Did the members of the Lincoln Back Country Protective 
Association^ have an enforceable public right to be informed 
of, and involved in, a prospective change in the status quo, 
regarding classification and use of the Lincoln Back Country 
as managed by the U.S. Forest Service? Does the public have 
a legal right to a thorough resource study of the relative 
values involved in the Lincoln Back Country and an impartial 
report of such a study with alternative management plans by 
the U.S.F.S.? According to trust law, the beneficiaries of 
the public trust in our national forest have equitable reme­
dies^ for enforcing the terms of the trust and the duties 
of the trustee.Initial consideration will be given to 
whether the Lincoln Back Country Protective Association's 
differences with the U.S.F.S. would be subject to court 
action for protection of public interests in our national 
forests in 1973. A brief discussion of the legal application 
94supra, 4^ 
9^An "equitable remedy" is a means by which a natural 
right or justice is enforced under the more flexible rules of 
equity. Some examples would be writ of mandamus, injunction, 
specific performance, and recission in equity. 
96supra. p. 13. 
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of the public trust doctrine to the merits of this case will 
follow. 
Federal Government Jurisdiction 
Litigation in this case doesn't appear to require a 
waiver of sovereign immunity and authorization of judicial 
review by the U.S. government. There are generally two excep­
tions to the rule of sovereign immunity: first, where an 
agent's powers are limited by statute and his actions are 
beyond that scope of power, and second, where an act is uncon-
97 stitutional or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. 
Usually in cases that are similar to that anticipated here, 
review is granted under Section 7 02 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, which provides: 
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, 
•or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action with­
in the meaning of the relevant statute, is entitled to 
judicial review thereof.98 
Section 704 provides in part: 
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final 
agency action for which there is no other adequate 
remedy in a court are subject to judicial review 
. . .99 
These statutory provisions establish Congressional 
intent to make final agency action reviewable in the federal 
9^Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 
U.S. 682 (1949). 
985 U.S.C.A. 702. 
"ibid. , section 7 04. 
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courts unless otherwise provided.There is no right of re­
view where a statute precludes judicial review or where a deci­
sion is committed to the discretion of an agency.Forest 
Service legislation gives no express provisions precluding 
judicial review. The question of "discretion" is explained 
in Knight Newspapers, Incorporated v. United States: 
A court may not review a decision committed to the dis­
cretion of an agency pursuant to a permissive type sta­
tute, but may do so where the decision was made pursuant 
to a mandatory type statute, even though the latter deci­
sion involves some degree of discretion.^03 
Decisions by the Forest Service under the Multiple 
Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960, have been found by the courts 
to be mandatory and subject to judicial review.In Gandt 
v. Hardin, the court concluded that in regard to the Multiple 
Use Act of 1960, "Congress was not enacting a permissive 
statute, but rather adopted a mandatory statutory list of 
factors to be considered in the development of the national 
forests. Tjie mandatory nature of the Multiple Use legis-
lOOAbbot Industries v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
"Only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a 
contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access 
to judicial review." 
1015 U.S.C. 701a. 
1 ̂Montgomery, og_. cit., p. 144. Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Forests of the Committee on Agriculture on 
the Subject of a Long Range Program for National Forests, 
86th Congress, 1st Session, p. 39 (1959). 
103395 F.2d 353, 358. 
lO^Gandt v. Hardin, Civil No. 1334 (W.D. Michigan, 1969). 
105Ibid., p. 12. 
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lation strongly suggests the affirmative duty of the Forest 
Service in that case. In two more recent cases, federal 
courts have granted jurisdiction for citizens to review the 
mandatory actions of the Forest Service.-*-®® Although there 
is substantial precedent for courts allowing judicial review 
under national forest legislation, the scope of that review 
once granted is usually very narrow in that courts hesitate 
to set aside administrative determinations. 
Standing to Sue 
"Standing" is the court determination of whether a 
person is the proper party to seek court review and whether 
there are the necessary adverse legal interests to the contro­
versy.- 8̂ The principle of standing is based on a test made 
up of two parts: the "injury in fact" test, and whether the 
interest is within the "zone of interests" to be protected 
1 hq or regulated by statute or constitutional guarantee. The 
106The West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island 
Creek Coal Co., Civil No. 70182-E (N.D. West Virginia, June 
1970). Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593 CD, Colo­
rado, February 1970). 
107por development of this point, see Montgomery, op. 
cit., pp. 142-51. 
1®8R. C. Keck, "Standing to Sue—-and Public Timber 
Resources," Natural Resources Lawyer (Vol. 3, July 1970), 
p. 444. K. C. Davis, "The Liberalized Law of Standing," 
University of Chicago Law Review (Vol. 37, 1970), p. 450. 
lO^Barlow v. Collin, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). Association 
of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 
U.S. 150 (1970). 
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most recent case on "citizens" standing in environmental 
lawsuits, Sierra Club v. Morton, 1972, '^requires that the party 
seeking review be himself among the injured," to sufficiently 
lay the basis for standing under the Administrative Procedure 
Act.-*--1-® This case will be discussed in detail as it is cen­
tral to the standing question. The Lincoln Back Country Pro­
tective Association (LBPA) could assert Section 702 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act which allows judicial review 
where citizens are adversely affected or aggrieved under 
111 mandatory legislation. 
In the case Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. 
Federal Power Commission, 1965, the court said: 
In order to insure that the FPC will adequately protect 
the public interest in aesthetic, conservational, and 
recreational aspects of power development, those who by 
their activities and conduct have exhibited a special 
interest in such areas, must be held to be included in 
the class of 'aggrieved' parties under section 313(b).H2 
The Lincoln Back Country Controversy centered on the public 
interest in the "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational" 
uses of national forest land that might have been destroyed 
by extensive Forest Service development. 
The District Judge in Road Review League, Town of 
Bedford v. Boyd, 1967, expanded on the Scenic Hudson case by 
saying: 
I have based my decision (as to plaintiff's standing) 
HO92 S.Ct. 1361, 1366 (1972). 
11:l5 U.S.C.A. 702. 
112354 F.2d 608, 616 (1965). 
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upon the implications, rather than the exact holding, 
of the recent decision of the Court of Appeals in 
Scenic Hudson. 
The Administrative Procedure Act (5 USC 702) entitles 
a person who is 'aggrieved fay agency action within the 
meaning of the relevant statute' to obtain judicial re­
view. 
I have concluded that these provisions are sufficient, 
under the principle of Scenic Hudson, to manifest a Con­
gressional intent that towns, local civic organizations, 
and conservation groups are to be considered 'aggrieved' 
by agency action which allegedly has disregarded their 
interests. H3 
Persons who have "environmental" interests in protecting the 
aesthetic and diverse quality of de facto wilderness in 
national forests have been granted standing to appear in 
Federal Court to challenge Forest Service actions in disre­
gard of their interests. 
Individual members of the LBPA would have to allege 
particular injury before the LBPA would be granted standing 
to represent those aggrieved persons. On April 19, 1972, the 
Supreme Court of the United States held that the Sierra Club, 
a leading environmental organization, did not have standing 
to challenge Forest Service approval of a thirty million 
dollar resort development in California's Mineral King Valley, 
a  p r i z e d  w i l d e r n e s s  a r e a  w i t h i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  f o r e s t , T h e  
113270 F. Supp. 660 (1967). 
l-^Gandt v. Hardin, Civil No. 1334 (W.D, Michigan, 
1969). The West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island 
Creek Coal Co., Civil No. 70182-E (N.D. West Virginia, June 
1970). Parker v. U.S., 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colorado, Feb­
ruary 1970). 
l-^Sierra club v. Morton, 92 S. Ct. 1361 (April 1972) . 
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Supreme Court held that the "injury in fact" test for standing, 
"requires that the party seeking review be himself among the 
injured.The Sierra Club, in its pleadings, did not 
allege that it or its members would be affected in any of 
their activities or pastimes by the resort development. The 
Supreme Court in this same case explained that the interest 
alleged to have been injured could be aesthetic, conservation-
al, recreational, as well as economic. And the Court said 
that once judicial review was properly invoked by individual 
members of the Sierra Club as "injured in fact" and within 
the "zone of interests," then the organization "may argue the 
public interest in support of his claim that the agency has 
117 failed to comply with its statutory mandate." The LBPA 
would have to allege individualized injury of its members to 
obtain standing. Since the membership of the LBPA is made up 
of local residents and active users of the national forest 
land in question, the procedural requirement of standing would 
probably have not been difficult to satisfy. 
Substantive Issues 
The question of judicial intervention in the Lincoln 
Back Country Controversy is moot today because of the recent 
Congressional enactment of the Scapegoat Wilderness Bill. 
The facts of the controversy are being used in this paper 
116Ibid., p. 1366. 
117Ibid., p. 1367. 
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because they serve to demonstrate the dramatic conflict that 
can result when the public is not involved in the public 
administration of the national forests. This section is 
addressed to the particular allegations that could be raised 
in court today if this controversy surfaced in 1973. 
Given the facts of this controversy, it seems that 
the U.S.F.S. consideration, adoption, and promotion of its 
Long Range Plan and subsequent plans for development of 
national forest lands which included the Lincoln Back Country 
can be considered arbitrary, capricious, and in contravention 
of their affirmative duty as trustee of the public trust in 
national forest reserves. Forest Service legislation since 
the onset of the Lincoln Back Country Controversy in 1963 
serves to further define the duties of the Forest Service as 
I 1 O 
trustee and, therefore, will be a part of this analysis. 
The terms of this trust as seen in national forest 
legislation and substantive trust law establish the powers 
and mandatory duties on the part of the Forest Service to 
protect and promote certain public uses in national forests. 
One of those public uses under the Multiple Use Act of 1960 
and the Wilderness Act of 1964 is wilderness.The Forest 
Service generally ignored the alternative of wilderness 
-'--'•^Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. 1131. National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Public Law 91-190. 
11916 U.S.C. 529. 16 U.S.C. 1131. 
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management (with the exception of some 18,000 acres of 
roadless "scenic area") until overwhelming political pres­
sure was brought to bear through Congress pressuring the 
120 agency to change its position. In addition, the Forest 
Service failed to thoroughly study the resource and use capa­
bilities for this forest area, especially in view of the 
"public interest" in the de facto wilderness area that had 
long been referred to as the Lincoln Back Country. The vari­
ous public interests in this national forest land were not a 
meaningful part of the administrative decision-making process. 
Public hearings were not held on the initiative of the agency 
nor upon request of the environmentalists concerned with the 
management plans for the area. There were public meetings 
held for the purpose of the Forest Service to justify its 
decision to develop the area. 
The trustee relationship would put the Forest Service 
in a position of giving reasons or justifications for its 
actions, upon a prima facia^l showing by the Lincoln Back 
Country Protective Association that Forest Service actions 
were in disregard of the terms of the trust. A prima facia 
case would probably have been limited to showing disregard 
of trustee duties and/or potential detrimental effect to 
120see footnote 82 and accompanying text, 
121"prima Facie Case" is one that has proceeded upon 
sufficient proof to that stage where it will support finding 
if evidence to contrary is disregarded. Black's Law Diction­
ary, op. cit. 
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public forest land. Preparation by the public for such a 
judicial confrontation would be expedited by the trust law 
requirement that the trustee must provide records and accounts 
of all trust activities, including how and why certain manage-
122 ment decisions were made. The public, often being the 
plaintiff bringing the suit, would have to sustain this 
initial burden of proof.-^3 without a public trust admini­
strative framework, citizens' access to information is costly 
and often impossible because government agencies are often 
privy to it. The public trust could serve to provide the 
public with immediate access to information and could more 
readily shift the burden of proof onto the agency for defend­
ing its actions. 
Judicial enforcement of the public trust is the weak­
est link in the application of the public trust doctrine to 
the environmental problems facing this country. Sax explains 
the significance of the doctrine in our courts by stating: 
"the fundamental function of the courts in the public trust 
area is one of democratization."^^ He explains the term 
"democratization" by stating that the role of the courts is 
not to "usurp" but rather to serve as a "catalyst" of the 
•̂ •̂ Supra, p. 12. 
j_s usually the rule of evidence that the party 
asserting the affirmative side of an issue, most often the 
plaintiff in a case, must sustain the burden of proof. 
Black's Law Dictionary, op. cit. 
0p# cit., p. 561. 
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1 n c 
legislative process. In this same vein, the role of the 
public administrator is not to "usurp" but rather to serve 
as a "catalyst" of the political process for reconciling 
diverse public interests. 
The application of the public trust doctrine must go 
beyond judicial intervention of administrative decisions. 
Government administration of environmental resources is where 
most people should realize the day to day reality of the 
democratic process. The application of the doctrine to the 
public administration of natural resources could provide 
the necessary framework for preventing environmental degrada­
tion, rather than trying to remedy despoilation after the fact. 
•^^Ibid. , p. 157. 
CHAPTER V 
IMPLICATIONS 
The conceptual and legal support for applying the 
public trust doctrine to government administration of nation­
al forest lands should be somewhat clear in the reader's mind. 
It is not yet clear, however, whether an administrative 
framework based upon this doctrine would significantly 
change (for the better) this "vast experiment in public 
administration." Would the trustee relationship, for ex­
ample, provide a truly democratic basis for professional 
management of forest resources? How would the political 
process work for determining the "public interests" (i.e., 
needs and wants at any point in time) on a particular 
parcel of public forest land? There are no definite answers 
to these questions. The implications that can be drawn from 
applying a trust relationship to national forest management 
should, however, help direct our thinking. 
Control over the ultimate allocation of forest re­
sources and uses could be in the hands of the public, as 
beneficiaries of the public trust in our national forests, 
under the public trust doctrine. One must hasten to add 
that the Forest Service, i.e., trustee, would have the power 
to manage the national forest lands for present productivity 
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for the benefit of the American people and to guarantee the 
alternative use options for future generations of Americans. 
The implication is that public interest groups would have 
to alter the terms of the trust through Congress to provide 
for a particular use of public forest lands inconsistant 
with present and long-term capabilities of the land. The 
Forest Service would only be responsible for forest manage­
ment based upon a productive and continuing trust for the 
impartial benefit of all present and possible future "public 
interests." 
Forest lands are most often capable of supporting 
varied resources and uses beneficial to different segments 
of the public. Trade-offs and compromises are inevitable 
under these circumstances. Alternative management plans can 
be formulated, with public participation, under the direction 
of the professional forest administrators. These plans should 
reflect the physical and biological carrying capacity of the 
forest land in question. The determination of which plan 
should be implemented is primarily a political question of 
reconciling divergent public interests. 
Under the public trust doctrine, these value deter­
minations would usually be left to the political process. 
The public administrator would be catalytic to these pro­
cesses, but would not be accountable for determining or recon­
ciling the needs and wants of the interested public. The 
Forest Service, then, would only "register" the public 
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decision as to the particular mix of resources and uses 
needed. If that decision was commensurate with the carrying 
capacity of the land, which it should be if public interest 
groups participated in the initial Forest Service planning 
process, the agency would implement the management alterna­
tive chosen by the public. 
A strength of the public trust framework for admini­
stration of environmental resources is that the costs attached 
to the planning process (with direct public involvement) 
would likely be social and economic in nature, rather than 
being detrimental to the forest ecosystem. When the public 
administrator has the power to protect the trust property 
from "invasion," and does not have to compromise the capa­
bility of the trust property, which could likely occur through 
political involvement by public administrators, then the pub­
lic administration of a "quality" environment is possible. 
If the particular public interests—this is assuming 
they are identifiable—are not able to reach a compromise as 
to the "best" mix of resources and uses for all publics parti­
cipating in the "administrative" planning process described 
above, then the public would have to turn to available legisla­
tive or judicial remedies. As stated earlier, the public 
administrator is not in the position to "usurp" the role of a 
politician, legislator, or judge. The public administrator, 
at best, is able to initiate public involvement and interest 
in determining what might be in the citizen's"best interest." 
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In the case of the Forest Service, the professional forester is 
faced with the task of managing forest land to maximize pre­
sent public benefits and protect future alternative uses, 
rather than being distracted by the impossible task of recon­
ciling the diversity of public interests in that forest land. 
Another strength of the public trust doctrine is found 
in the "checks and balances" available to carry out the trust 
intent. Both the trustee and the beneficiary have responsi­
bilities under trust law for continuance of the trust within 
the terms of the particular trust. The authority for main­
taining and protecting the trust is vested in the powers and 
duties of the trustee, rights of the beneficiaries, and ulti­
mately in the courts of this land. The sharply defined 
responsibilities under trust law would allow for effective 
judicial enforcement, if necessary, of the trustee's duties 
in carrying out the trust intent. The trustee, on the other 
hand, has the power to protect and make productive the trust 
property. These checks and balances are within the best 
traditions of our democratic form of government. 
Without the public trust framework of public rights 
and administrative powers to promote and protect our national 
forests, the elements of representative democracy seem to be 
missing, and the social and economic costs often attached to 
resource allocation decisions are taking a significant toll 
on the natural environment and indirectly on man himself. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has demonstrated the conceptual and legal 
basis for the application of a public trust doctrine to the 
public administration of national forest reserves. In addi­
tion, the paper offers the trustee relationship, elements of 
which are already inherent in the Forest Service management 
of national forests, as a meaningful framework for putting 
the "public" back into public administration and limiting 
public administrators to a role of catalytic agent to the 
political process. Biological and physical knowledge of 
the environment is an important factor in managing any 
natural environment; but, the human wants and needs within 
that environment—and which can best be defined by those 
very inhabitants—are as important and must be considered in 
the environmental management decisions. If the public is 
not able to determine what is best for themselves, then there 
is always the risk that government bureaucracies will dictate 
a life-style different from what man wants. 
The "environmental Seventies" could be marked by the 
large number of citizens concerned with and wanting to do 
something about restoring and maintaining environmental 
quality for present and future use. Government agencies 
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have an opportunity to capitalize on this public demand for 
a meaningful role in the administrative decision-making pro­
cess. What is needed, then, is a clear statement of "defined" 
responsibility delegated to governmental agencies and a cor­
responding right by the public for working together to achieve 
a quality environment. 
The public trust doctrine delegates the responsibility 
for promoting and protecting trust property. This doctrine 
can serve to bridge the fundamental problems facing both 
the public and the Forest Service in managing the national 
forests today. Citizens concerned with the state of the en­
vironment feel they have lost control to government agencies 
in effecting meaningful change for meeting public needs and 
wants. On the other hand, the government agencies have such 
broad, sweeping delegations of power that they are being held 
responsible for man's negative impact on the natural environ­
ment. The public trust in the national forests sets out the 
duties and powers of the Forest Service, and the rights of 
the public, for a complementary management effort. The 
responsibility on the parts of both parties for environmental 
management of forest resources is present under the public 
trust doctrine. 
Judicial recognition of the public trust in environ­
mental resources is not likely in the next few years, when 
it will be needed most. Bernard Cohen referred to the state 
of the public trust doctrine in the context of the famous 
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civil rights case of Brown v. Board of Education,1-26 when he 
stated: "It will take scholarly research, imaginative plead­
ing, skilled advocacy, and an informed court to hand down 
the 'Brown* of environmental rights."127 ŝ a practical 
matter, few lawyers know about the possible application of 
the public trust doctrine. If they know about it, few are 
risking the immediate objectives of their clients for the 
possibility of establishing a landmark precedent for a public 
1 9ft trust xn the envxronment. 
The public trust doctrine will probably have to be 
explicitly stated in a legislative enactment or as a consti­
tutional amendment. Public trust legislation should contain 
at least three elements if it stands a chance of proving to 
be an effective framework for public administration of 
environmental resources and uses. First, the nature and 
extent of the trust must be sharply delineated. If the 
distinction between the "subject matter of the trust" and the 
"public interest in the trust" is clear, there is less threat 
to proprietory interests by government and private individuals 
126349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
l^Cohen, ojo. cit. , p. 392. 
128it has been noted that attorneys concerned with 
establishing environmental policy through the courts are able 
to plead alternative theories in their briefs, just for the 
purpose of covering themselves in the event a judge does not 
accept one of the doctrines used to support a client's posi­
tion. 
129Supra, pp. 14, 24, 37. 
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Second, there should be an express designation of the trustee 
and the duties and powers necessary for effective management 
of the trust. For example, the limitation of trustee respon­
sibility to managing present productivity and guaranteeing 
future public uses could be a part of this statement. 
Finally, the beneficiaries of the public trust should be 
defined as those persons, in their capacity as members of 
the public, who are intended to benefit from the trust. 
Rights and accompanying responsibilities of the beneficiary 
class must be stated. For example, the beneficiaries should 
have the right to enforce the terms of the trust and the 
duties of the trustee in equity. It could also be stated 
that the beneficiary has no right to infringe upon the 
trustee's duties to reasonably carry out the trust intent, 
except insofar as the management affects the receipt of 
proceeds by the beneficiary. 
The public trust doctrine is not a panacea, but is 
simply a framework for combining the concerns of citizens 
with the professional management by government administra­
tors for working together on the problems of man's interaction 
with the environment. It is a delegation of clearly defined 
responsibilities to these parties, both very necessary for 
determining the"public good"in the allocation of natural 
resources. It is a framework that allows for changing prior­
ities in public policy and for constant alteration in the 
terras of the trust through legislation. It is a mechanism 
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by which the agency has flexibility to apply its expertise, 
and the public has the right to actively participate in the 
determination of their "best interests" through the allocation 
of natural resources. It is the public right to enforce the 
trust, and the agency power to promote and protect the trust. 
The public can become an integral part of the public 
administration of the national forests by implementation of 
the doctrine of public trust. Government agencies stand to 
gain by encouraging the public to accept the.responsibility 
that accompanies the right to participate in forest-resource 
allocation decisions. Citizens stand to gain by satisfying 
their needs and wants in public forest lands through their 
participation in forest management for their own best inter­
ests. The Forest Service must put its trust in the people 
before that agency will realize its potential as professional 
manager of the trust the people have put in our national 
forests. 
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